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Abstract 
 
This paper focuses on two issues that challenge the accepted pessimistic view that 
regional trade agreements (RTAs) between developing countries in welfare terms 
by taking into account scale economies in transport. First, how is the standard 
welfare analysis of an RTA affected by the endogeneity of transport costs (i.e. by 
the joint determination of trade quantities and transport costs)? Second, what are 
the long-run consequences of endogenous transport costs for welfare if worldwide 
free trade is achieved through RTAs?  A standard model of inter and intra-industry 
trade is augmented by a “hub-and-spoke” transport network structure, where the 
standard “iceberg” transport cost model is contrasted with one in which transport 
costs depend on the distance between trade partners, the volume of trade, and the 
level of development. Under a plausible parameterization for scale economies in 
transport, regional liberalization will have persistent effect on trade flows through 
an irreversible effect on regional transport costs that improves welfare. Free trade 
achieved under an RTA leads to permanently higher welfare than under 
multilateral liberalization. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Ever since Viner’s (1950) pioneering study, the ambiguous impact on welfare of  
Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) has been analyzed in terms of the relative 
magnitude of trade creation and trade diversion. Recently, transport costs have 
been recognized among the factors that could influence this trade-off. Wonnacott 
and Lutz (1989) first argued that RTAs are more likely to be welfare enhancing 
when formed among what they called “natural trading partners”, i.e. countries 
geographically closed. Krugman (1991a, 1991b) developed and popularized this 
idea in a monopolistically competitive framework, showing that continental free 
trade areas (i) decrease welfare unambiguously with zero inter-continental 
transport costs, (ii) increase welfare unambiguously with prohibitive inter-
continental transport costs.  Relying on simulations where transport costs take 
continuous values between zero and prohibitive values,  Frankel, Stein and Wei 
(1996),  conclude that all else constant, a preferential trade agreement is more 
likely to be welfare enhancing (i)  the more remote the continental trading 
partners are from the rest of the world (i.e. the larger inter-continental transport 
costs are)  thereby limiting potential trade diversion and (ii) the more “natural”  
(i.e. the closer in distance)  trading partners are thereby fostering potential trade 
creation (see Baier and Bergstrand (2004) for a complete survey on simulation 
results). 
 
The “natural trading partner” argument potentially concerns 77% of existing RTAs. 
It is particularly relevant for RTAs between developing countries (or regional 
“South-South” agreements), notably in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) where many 
RTAs are implemented between neighboring countries that are quite remote from 
major world markets.2 Actually, though developing countries benefit from some 
recent technological advances that reduce transport costs, extensive 
documentation attests to their still facing considerably higher transport costs than 
developed countries. Shipping costs, for instance, are dramatically higher for 
                                                     
2 Of the 208 PTAs notified to the GATT/WTO in 2004,  160 are implemented between countries of 
a same region. Source: World Trade Organization secretariat and Author’s calculation. To name a 
few: MERCOSUR, the customs union involving Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay; the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement 
(SAPTA), the Southern African Custom Union (SACU), The Economic and Monetary Union of 
West Africa (UEMOA), the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC).  
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developing countries according to the price quotes from international freight 
forwarders (see Hummels, 1999, Limao and Venables, 2001 or Busse, 2003). 
Geographic impediments (such as landlockness), poor transport infrastructure 
(Limao and Venables, 2001) contribute to explain these high transport costs in 
developing countries. Moreover, as shown by Hummels (2001), Clark, Dollar and 
Micco (2002) and Djankov et al. (2006), other cost-raising factors like time in 
shipping or custom clearance further increase transport costs for developing 
countries.  Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004) conclude that trade costs represent 
a significant handicap for developing countries.  
 
So far, the literature has characterized the environment describing  developing 
countries by assuming  “iceberg” transport costs (à la  Samuelson, 1954) which 
supposes that only a constant fraction of the quantity shipped actually arrives (as 
if “only a fraction of the ice exported reaches its destination as un-melted ice”). 
Virtually, all simulation models so far analyzing the welfare of regional trade 
liberalization have relied on this representation of transport costs, thus ignoring 
the potential effect of scale economies in transport (e.g. Frankel, Stein and Wei, 
1996, Nitsch, 1996, Frankel, 1997, Spilimbergo and Stein, 1998, Baier and 
Bergstrand, 2004). Simply put, transport costs are assumed unaffected by 
equilibrium quantities traded.   
 
There is now strong direct evidence of the importance of scale economies in 
shipping costs. Using a dataset covering the bilateral trade of six importers 
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, and the United States) with all 
exporters worldwide in 1994, Hummels and Skiba (2004) find that doubling trade 
quantities along a route reduces shipping costs by 12 percent for all countries on 
that route. The same order of magnitude is reported by Tomoya and Nishikimi 
(2002) : a 1% increase in the number of ships on a particular route between Japan 
and each of the Southeast Asian ports resulted in a 0.12% reduction in the freight 
rates. Fink, Mattoo and Neagu (2002), studying the liner transport price on all US 
imports carried by liners from 59 countries in 1998, also conclude to significant 
economies of scale with regard to traffic originating from the same port. 
 
What are the sources of these scale economies in shipping? Hummels and Skiba 
(2004) identify three main sources of reductions in transport costs as trade 
quantities increase. First, a densely traded route allows for effective use of “hub-
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2007.26 
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and-spoke” shipping economies.3 Second, increased quantities traded encourage 
the introduction of specialized transport technologies along a route (as 
standardized containerized shipping for maritime transport). A third source of 
scale benefits lies in pro-competitive effect on pricing (limiting the monopoly 
markups of for instance the “liner conferences”) to which we return shortly.  
 
In the model developed in this paper, I focus on the second source of scale 
economies in transport: the adoption of new transport technology when trade 
increases (the first source is exogenously imposed by a pre-determined “hub-and-
spoke” transport network built into the model)4. As to the endogenous market 
structure, I take the extreme, but arguably realistic case for small developing 
countries, of a transport sector provided by a monopolist. Hence, in the model, 
according to the volume traded, a monopoly shipper decides whether to pay sunk 
costs (such as investment in infrastructure) in order to adopt a lower marginal cost 
transport technology.  
 
The justification for this approach stems from the importance of the welfare-
reducing effects of high transport costs associated with low trade volume ,and 
further exacerbated by low competition intensity. For example the problem of 
“cargo reservation schemes” and liner conferences whereby only one shipping 
company will cover a route because of low traffic densities leads to monopoly 
practices (see the evidence in Hummels 1999, Fink, Mattoo and Neagu, 2002). 
Furthermore, in this environment, the adoption of new technologies such as 
containerization may be delayed by such market structure (see Hummels, 1999).  
 
Moreover, the set-up developed in this paper takes into account a critique that has 
been raised against the “natural trading partner hypothesis”, namely that 
differences in costs determined by comparative advantage could be an important 
factor weighing against the benefits of trade between close partners. As noted by 
Panagariya (1998, p.294),  “distant partners can be efficient suppliers of certain 
products due to other cost advantages despite the fact that they must incur higher 
transport costs.” In a comment to a model by Frankel, Stein and Wei (1996), 
                                                     
3 For instance, as explained by Hummels and Skiba (2004), small container vessels move 
quantities into a hub where containers are aggregated into much larger and faster containership 
for longer hauls. 
4 Tomoya and Nishikimi (2002) determine hubs endogenously in relation to trade volume. 
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Krugman (1998, p.115)  also notes that the restriction of identical economic size 
may not be innocuous and “surely makes a major difference when we try to model 
the effects of integration”.  In this paper, I take the view that differences in costs 
related to economic size, is sufficient to capture the concerns raised by Panagariya 
(1998) since larger countries will have lower production costs, while at the same 
time maintaining the parsimony afforded by an otherwise symmetric modeling 
framework. 
 
Based on this evidence and stylized description of the transport sector in 
developing countries, the paper addresses the issue of the welfare costs of RTAs by 
answering two questions. First, how is the standard welfare analysis of regional 
trade liberalization affected by the endogeneity of transport costs (i.e. if trade 
quantities and transport costs are jointly determined)? By boosting bilateral trade 
among members, regional liberalization exploits scale economies along regional 
routes (through the adoption of new transport technologies) and then leads to a 
reduction in transport costs.   
 
Second, what are the consequences of endogenous transport costs for welfare if 
worldwide free trade is achieved via preferential trade agreements rather than via 
multilateral trade liberalization?5 Suppose that the long-run objective is worldwide 
free trade. With exogenous transport costs (i.e. transport costs independent to the 
level of trade), the welfare achieved under worldwide free trade is independent of 
the chosen path (i.e. via regionalism or multilateral liberalization). Now, suppose 
endogenous transport technology. Sequencing then matters because of sunk costs 
in transportation.  South-South RTAs will then generate persistent effects on 
member countries’ trade flows and welfare when they liberalize trade by regional 
route.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 adapts a standard monopolistic 
competition model with inter-industry trade in an agricultural product produced 
under constant returns to scale and a manufacturing sector under monopolistic 
                                                     
5This question is inspired from Freund (2000)’s paper which addresses the sequencing issue raised 
by Bhagwati (1993). Using a model with imperfect competition, she shows that a sequencing in 
which liberalization takes place via an RTA leads to a greater expansion in world output than 
immediate free trade because of sunk costs to expand trade and investment first realized within the 
regional borders.  Actually, permanent effects from RTAs arise if firms undertake irreversible 
investments that reduce production and distribution network costs before free trade is achieved.  
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competition with scale economies in production borrowed from Spilimbergo and 
Stein (1998). An explicit “hub-and-spoke” transport sector with a profit 
maximizing monopolist choosing endogenously his transport technology 
completes this stylized representation of production and trade in a developing 
country.  Section 3 applies the model to a 4-continent world with two types of 
countries: North and South which differ by size and economies of scale. As a start, 
section 3 compares the welfare evolution according to the degree of tariff 
preference within symmetric regional bloc (i.e. blocs within neighbor countries of 
South-South and North-North type) with exogenous / endogenous transport costs. 
Section 4 then tackles the sequencing issue by contrasting welfare results when 
worldwide free trade is achieved through a regional path vs. a multilateral non-
discriminatory path. Section 5 studies how sensitive the results are to the “hub-
and-spoke” transport network assumption. Results are also extended for North-
South agreements. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Overview of the Model6 
 
2.1. Basic Setup  
 
The model includes 3 sectors augmented by a transport sector developed in 
section 2.2. Following Spilimbergo and Stein (1998), we assume 3 sectors: 
agriculture, intermediate inputs, and manufactures, and 2 factors of production: 
capital (K) and labor (L). We consider 2 types of countries, which differ only in 
their capital endowment. In “poor” countries (subscript, p), each individual is 
endowed with 1 unit of capital, as well as 1 unit of labor. In “rich” countries 
(subscript r), each individual owns 1 unit of labor and k units of capital (where 
k>1). Imposing symmetry within groups and a similar model structure across 
country groupings improves significantly the tractability of the model while 
capturing in a stylized way, the main features necessary to include transport costs 
and preferential trade policy. 
 
A representative consumer in country i share a Cobb-Douglas utility function 
given by: 
                                                     
6
 Appendix A.1, available upon request, provides a complete description of the model. 
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 ( ) ( ) { }1 0 1 ;i mi ai iU C C r pα α α− == < ≤  (1) 
With ( )m a iC the consumption of manufactures (agriculture) in country i, α  (1 α− ) 
the share of consumer’s income spent on manufactures (agriculture). 
 
Technology is Ricardian throughout. In Agriculture, a homogeneous good is 
produced under constant returns to scale with labor as the only input with labor 
productivity set at unity by choice of units. Production is then given by:   
 { }, ;ai ai iq L r p==  (2) 
Therefore, under perfect competition:  
      { }, ;ai i ip w r p==                (3) 
with 
aip the price of agriculture and iw the wage in country i.7 
A Final manufactured good is produced for domestic consumption under a 
Dixit-Stiglitz technology for intermediate inputs with constant returns to scale, 
each intermediate input entering symmetrically into its production: 
( ) { }1 , 0 1 , 1.. ;mi ji iq c m j n i r pθ θ θ= < < = =∑          (4) 
 
jic being the consumption of the j
th variety produced in country i and θ capturing 
the extent of product differentiation across intermediates of different origin (“love 
of variety”) . As θ approaches 1, 1/(1 )σ θ= − → ∞ , and intermediates of different 
origin become perfect substitutes, intra-industry trade is eliminated and only 
inter-industry trade remains. 
 
Intermediate inputs are also produced with a Ricardian technology with capital 
as input under monopolistic competition. Increasing returns to scale is captured 
by assuming a fixed cost, γ , and a constant marginal cost, β : 
ji jiK xγ β= +   ⇔ { }, 1.. ;jiji iKx j n i r pγβ
−
= = =          (5) 
jix  is the production of the j
th variety in country i; in  is the number of intermediate 
input varieties produced in country i; and jiK is the total amount of capital used in 
                                                     
7 The wage in a poor country, wp, is used as numéraire in the model. 
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the production of the jth variety in country. Profit maximization combined with 
free entry gives output per variety: 
{ }, 1, ,. ;(1 )ji i ix x j n r p
θγ
β θ == = =− K          (6) 
 
Adding the capital constraint in each country to eq (6) implies that the number of 
varieties produced in equilibrium is determined by relative country-size here 
captured by relative endowments of capital: 
 
( ) { }1 , ;ii iKn r pθγ =
−
=      and     r
p
r
p
n
k
n
K
K
= =        (7) 
A larger number of varieties produced in countries well-endowed in capital lead to 
lower unit production costs in these countries, thereby introducing indirectly the 
concern of factor endowment based models that differences in costs matter. 
 
2.2. Transport costs and Geography 
 
Following the literature, I consider a symmetric world divided into a number of 
continents, C, equidistant from one another and comprising the same number of 
countries, regions, and blocs. There are 4 continents (C=4) and 64 countries (32 
rich countries spread over 2 continents and 32 poor countries over the two other 
continents). Each continent is decomposed into 4 regions. I assume that each RTA 
bloc is implemented between the 4 neighboring countries of a same region. This 
allows us to concentrate on “North-North” and “South-South” blocs, leaving other 
alternatives to later. 
 
As in the recent literature on economic geography (e.g. Frankel, Stein and Wei, 
1996, Spilimbergo and Stein, 1998, Fujita, Krugman, and Venables, 1999), I 
assume a “hub-and-spoke” transport network. This is in accordance with: 
 (i) The emergence in recent decades of transport hubs as a privileged network 
structure for many types of transport services, notably for freight and air;8 
                                                     
8 In the case of maritime transport that largely dominates international trade, vessels size 
increased drastically in relation to the development of containerization. Container traffic is 
moreover essentially concentrated in major hub ports. The 20 largest container ports handled 
more than 52% of all the traffic in 2002. Examples include the European hub of Rotterdam, as well 
as Asian hubs in Singapore and Hong Kong ( see UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport, 2003). 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2007.26 
 10 
(ii) The assumption of scale economies in the transport sector, as it is precisely the 
search for lower unit transport costs that has generated the development of “hub-
and-spoke” transport networks (see e.g. Tomoya and Nishikimi, 2002).  
 
In this set-up, each country represents a “spoke” and two levels of “hub” are 
assumed: regional and continental. As shown in figure 1, 3 freight rates (in % of 
the quantity traded) characterize transport costs: 
bf : intra-regional (from spoke to spoke via the regional hub); 
cf : intra-continental (from a regional hub to another via the continental hub);  
of : inter-continental (from a continental hub to another). 
 
Insert here Figure 1: “Hub-and-Spoke” transport network 
 
Trade between two countries in the same region involves two spokes and one 
regional hub, which implies transport costs equal to bf . Similarly, in the case of 
trade between countries in different regions of a same continent, transport costs 
are equal to ( )b cf f+  as two spokes, two regional hubs and one continental hub 
are implicated. Finally, across-ocean trade generates costs of ( )b c of f f+ + . 
Hence, implicitly, transport costs depend positively on distance. 
 
I approach the modeling of transport costs in two ways: the traditional “iceberg” 
approach where ( ), ,b c of f f  represent the fraction of output lost by the exporting 
country en route to its destination (as in e.g. Frankel, Stein and Wei 1996, Frankel 
1997, Spilimbergo and Stein 1998 or Baier and Bergstrand 2004) and one where 
( ), ,b c of f f  represent the freight rate charged by a monopolist (see below). These 
two alternatives are described in table 1. Since only relative transport costs matter, 
I assume 0b cf f= =  for rich countries to reflect the fact that transport costs vary 
according to the development level of countries. For a given distance, North-North 
trade is less costly in terms of transport costs than North-South trade, which is in 
                                                                                                                                                               
The extraordinary development of “hub-and-spoke” networks is also observed in airlines since 
deregulation. 
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turn less costly than South-South trade. Finally, for simplicity, I assume equal 
transport costs for intermediate inputs and agriculture products. 
 
Letting ( )r pp  be the producer price in a rich (poor) country, these assumptions on 
geography and transport costs gives rise to the c.i.f prices reported in table 1. 
 
Insert here Table 1: “c.i.f. prices under alternatives transport models” 
 
Table 1 shows that transport costs: (i)  increase the prices of foreign intermediate 
inputs faced by producers of manufactures, and: (ii) increase the difference in 
relative price of agriculture goods between rich and poor countries which in turn 
increases the wage gap between rich and poor countries. Tariffs levied on c.i.f. 
prices. 
 
2.3. Transport Sector with Scale Economies 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, for maritime transport, many trade routes are 
serviced by a small number of liner companies organized in formal cartels called 
“liner conferences” (see Hummels, 1999). Moreover, a movement towards 
concentration has occurred which would not imply market power if transport 
routes were contestable.9 At least one study, by Fink, Mattoo and Neagu (2002), 
has found evidence that freight rates are sensitive to regulatory changes meant to 
constrain collusive behavior by liner conferences, suggesting the exertion of 
market power. For developing countries, several studies indicate that factors such 
as national policies which severely restrict competition for transport services have 
a major influence on the level of freight rates.10 
 
                                                     
9 Only a dozen firms in the World share 80% of the container traffic (against 40%, 10 years ago). 
The two leaders accounting for more than 23% of the traffic, reinforced their domination by taking 
over hub ports and signing agreements (as the Trans Atlantic Container Agreement) thereby 
forcing loaders to deal with them (see Rodrigue et al., 2004). 
10 For instance, much of Sub-Saharan Africa international transport is cartelized, reflecting the 
regulations of African governments intended to promote national shipping companies and airlines. 
Notably, as described by Amjadi and Yeats (1996) or Collier and Gunning (1999), many African 
governments (especially West African countries) have adopted “cargo reservation schemes” which 
allow privileged liner operators to set inflated freight rates considerably above those that would 
prevail in a competitive environment and also to extend inferior quality services.   
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2007.26 
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Modeling the transport sector as a monopoly presents two advantages. First, it 
captures the monopoly markup often observed in transport service prices on two 
types of routes: maritime (corresponding to transport between two continental 
hubs in our framework) and within the South continent.11  Second, investment in 
new transport technology can be easily introduced explicitly in the model as a 
function of the shipper’s profit. 
 
As proposed by Hummels and Skiba (2004), I assume that a monopoly shipper 
takes decisions about how to price transport services and which transport 
technology to use, maximizing the following profit function,pi : 
 
b b c c o o b c of q f q f q C C Cpi = + + − − −          (8) 
 
With , ,b c oq q q the total traded quantities requiring respectively intra-regional, 
intra-continental and across ocean transport services and , ,b c oC C C the cost 
functions associated with the production of ,b cf f  and of  respectively.  
 
Transport costs along a given route ( ), ,h b c o∈  decline with the volume of trade 
along that route by adopting the following Ricardian technology with fixed (or 
sunk) costs, hF , and constant marginal costs, hκ  per unit shipped: 
 
{ }, ; ;h h h hC F q h b c oκ= + =          (9) 
 
To produce transport services, without loss of generality, the monopolist uses 
labor from the poor country where labor costs are lower. Each transport 
technology is characterized by the combination of parameters{ };h hF κ . The initial 
technology is assumed to require no fixed costs, 0hF = , but has a high marginal 
cost per unit shipped. Then, as trade quantities along a route increase, the 
monopoly can choose to improve the transport technology used on that route, i.e. 
                                                     
11 Note that the monopoly assumption does not concern transport within the North continent as we 
have assumed fb=fc=0 for rich countries. Transport sector for these countries can then be seen as a 
competitive one, in accordance with features of transport sector in Europe or North America. 
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to purchase a reduction in marginal cost of hκ∆  with an incremental fixed cost hF , 
according to the following relation:  
{ }, 0,1 , ,hh hF e b c oµ κ µ∆ <= − =         (10) 
In this set-up, changes in technology are discrete12, irreversible and occur when 
the profit associated with the new technology overcomes the profit associated with 
the old one.  Note that equation (10)  assumes that a given reduction in marginal 
cost requires greater fixed costs when marginal costs are already small than when 
marginal costs are high and, to ease interpretation,  a given investment generates a 
similar reduction in marginal costs (µ constant) whatever the selected route h 
(regional, continental or inter-continental). 
  
The parameters entering the cost function in equation (10) are calibrated using 
estimates in the literature as follows.  Start with the most costly technology: 
5%hκ =  & 0hF = , { }, ,h b c o= . To anticipate results of the simulations 
reported in section 3 where regional integration starts from an initial situation 
with a non discriminatory (i.e. MFN) tariff on imports of t=30%, the prices of 
transport services that maximize the shipper’s profit are the following: 
,9.6%bf =  ,10.1%cf =  6.5%of =  which implies transport costs in the 10%-
20% (of quantity traded) range for a representative poor country (see table 2, 
column 2). These are in accordance with estimates on the level of transport costs 
sustained by developing countries (see Limao and Venables, 2001, Hummels, 
1999, 2001, Amjadi and Yeats 1996).  
 
Consider now economies of scale. According to remarkably similar econometric 
estimates for different regions of the world by Hummels and Skiba (2004) and 
Tomoya and Nishikimi (2002), a 1% increase in trade volume along a route 
reduces freight rates by 0.12% percent for all countries on that route. I assume that 
each investment in new technology induces a gain in marginal cost of 0.2 point of 
percentage, then determine the value of µ  (and of the fixed costs) that constrains 
the monopoly shipper to reduce freight rates charged along a route by around 
                                                     
12 As noted by Hummels and Skiba, 2004, “one can think of this choice either as a single yes/no 
decision on, for example, port infrastructure or [...] as a menu of ship sizes which the shipper can 
select”. 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2007.26 
 14 
0.12% for each 1% increase in trade volume along that route. The value of µ  that 
satisfies the preceding constraint is -15. Hence, starting from the initial technology 
5%hκ =  & 0hF = , the next technology corresponds to a marginal cost of 4.8% 
requiring a fixed cost around 
( 15 )*( 0.2%) 1 0.03iF e
− −
= − = which represents around 
10% of the monopoly profit in the initial situation (i.e. under MFN and with the 
initial technology).  Figure 2 illustrates average transport costs for the shipper as a 
function of distance under this calibration. 
 
Insert here Figure 2: “Evolution of the average cost for the monopoly shipper” 
 
2.4. Equilibrium 
 
Profit, utility maximization and free entry in the production of intermediates lead 
to a vector of production and consumption in each country and to the 
corresponding factor and product prices. Departing from earlier contributions, the 
model also determines the profit maximizing transport technology by a monopoly 
shipper (whose profits are symmetrically distributed to the representative 
consumer across rich countries) and the corresponding freight rates charges. 
Given the values of the ad-valorem tariff rate (t), the degree of intra-bloc 
preference (d), the difference in capital endowment (k) and the parameters 
describing preferences, technology for production and transport, together with the 
wage normalization 1pw = , each equilibrium yields a value for the welfare 
indicator of a representative individual in a country.  The focus of attention in the 
remainder of the paper is how individual welfare in a poor country, i.e. 
pW , 
changes under a trade policy organized around a trading bloc relative to a non-
discriminatory policy. The full system of equations describing the model is 
reported in appendix A.1 available upon request. 
 
3. Welfare Implication of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) 
 
We start with welfare implications of PTAs, and then turn to multilateral trade 
liberalization in section 4. The set-up throughout assumes (C=4), 2 rich and 2 poor 
ones, with 16 countries per continent ( 16r pN N= = ). Each continent has 4 regions. 
I assume that blocs are implemented between the 4 neighbor countries of a region 
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( 4B = ). All countries are assumed to levy the same tariff rate of 30% on imports 
from non member ( 0.3t = ) and to levy an intra-bloc tariff of ( )1Bt d t= −  on 
imports from member countries, where d  represents the preference margin 
within the bloc (0 1d≤ ≤ ). Half of consumer income is spent on agricultural goods 
( 0.5α = ) and the elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods, σ , is equal 
to 4 (i.e. 0.75θ = ). 
 
3.1. Traditional “Iceberg” Transport Costs  
 
Since several patterns hold under both endogenous and exogenous transport costs, 
we start with “iceberg” transport costs. This also helps us relate the results under 
endogenous transport costs to previous ones which all assumed exogenous 
transport costs. Figure 3 (and others) shows how welfare for a representative poor 
country, i.e. 
pW ,  varies when the preference margin d in favor of the regional 
partner increases. For each set of parameter values, welfare is normalized to 1 
under the initial MFN world ( 0 1
pW = ). 
 
Note first, the inverted U-shape for 
pW  as preferential margins increase for all 
configurations and parameter values. This typical second-best result was first 
noted by Meade (1955) with a slightly different model. Here, as in the Meade 
model, the marginal benefits from reducing the wedge decrease whereas the 
marginal costs of creating a wedge by discriminating between trading partners 
increases.13  
 
Start then with a totally symmetric world ( )1k = . This implies that only intra-
industry trade occurs between countries (agriculture is not traded as there is no 
comparative advantage). All countries being identical in terms of economic size, 
relative factor endowments, trade, tariffs and transport costs, the specification is 
                                                     
13 More concretely, the initial reduction in intra-bloc tariffs leads to a small amount of trade 
diversion following the shift away from foreign varieties that were consumed in similar proportions 
for d=0 (and no transport cost). At the same time, trade creation effects are large because domestic 
varieties (with smaller marginal utility, as they are already consumed in large quantities) are 
replaced by the bloc members’ varieties. Approaching the last reduction in intra-bloc tariffs (d=1) 
however, consumption of member and domestic varieties are equalized with a small marginal gain, 
while the marginal loss of a reduction in foreign varieties is now large: welfare effects of trade 
creation are then negligible while trade diversion effects are large. 
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very close to the monopolistically competitive framework in a perfect symmetric 
world proposed by Frankel, Stein and Wei (1996) and Frankel (1997).  
 
Insert here Figure 3: “Welfare  under a PTA with Exogenous Transport Costs”    
 
In the absence of transport costs ( 0b c of f f= = = ), pW reaches a maximum value 
( )maxpW for a degree of intra-bloc preference of around 7% (which implies an intra-
bloc tariff 28%Bt = ) and  0
p pW W<  for  26.2%Bt =  ( 12.6%d = ). Figure 3 shows 
that the introduction of positive «iceberg» transport costs changes the relative 
magnitude of trade creation and trade diversion effects and then max
pW  but does 
not challenge the overall inverted-U path of welfare. With positive inter-
continental transport costs and zero intra-continental transport costs, relative 
inter-continental transport costs increase, diminishing the volume of trade with 
remote countries (on other continents). As expected, reduced trade with remote 
countries diminishes the costs of implementing sub-continental PTAs and hence 
also greater utility gains. As shown in figure 3, with 0.2of = , maxp pW W= for 
11%d = and for 20.2%d > we face what Frankel et al. (1995) call a “supernatural 
agreement” to describe a welfare-reducing PTA (i.e. 0
p pW W< ) among natural 
partners. 
 
Consider now an asymmetric world ( )3k =  as in Spilimbergo and Stein (1998). 
Not surprisingly, the welfare path for a poor country shown in figure 3 is very 
similar to the path under total symmetry as introducing inter-industry trade with 
the distant (Northern partner) in effect destroys the positive effects of having 
lower relative transport costs within the Southern trading bloc. Total welfare costs 
of discrimination are higher because countries derive utility not only from product 
differentiation in consumption, but also because of differences in costs.  
 
Insert here Table 2: “Transport costs and Welfare under Different scenarios” 
 
Figure 3 also reports a simulation with both an asymmetric set-up and non-zero 
intra-continental transport costs for poor countries. Hence, transport costs are 
now a function not only of distance but also of the trade partner’s development 
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level, as described in section 2.2, table 1. This corresponds to our stylized 
representation of the world and I refer to it as the “benchmark” in the following 
discussion. I assume 0.1of =  and for poor countries: 0.1b cf f= = . Table 2 
column 1 reports the corresponding bilateral transport costs derived from the 
formulas in table 1. As expected from non-zero intra-continental transport costs,14 
figure 3 indicates that the negative return of regionalism for a representative poor 
country sets in later ( 0
p pW W< for 32%d  , i.e. 20%Bt  ).  
 
3.2. Endogenous Transport Costs  
 
Traded quantities and transport costs are now jointly determined along the lines 
described in section 2.3: a monopoly shipper (monopolist for short) jointly 
chooses profit-maximizing prices and transport technology. The implications of 
this approach to endogenous transport costs are studied in two steps: in a first 
step, the monopolist fixes transport service prices with a single transport 
technology, then in a second step the monopolist jointly chooses prices and 
transport technology. Figure 4 decomposes the evolution of the welfare indicator 
as a function of the preferential margin under both scenarios for the same regional 
PTA considered earlier. 
  
Single transport technology. Under the high-cost single transport technology 
described in section 2.3, 5%hκ =  & 0hF = , { }, ,h b c o= , the evolution of 
pW appears to be less favorable to PTAs than the one obtained with exogenous 
“iceberg” costs in section 3.1 (benchmark from figure 3 reported in figure 4) . 
Tariff reduction, through the reduction of the elasticity of transport demand, 
causes the monopolist to charge a higher markup over marginal costs which lowers 
trade creation, a result also obtained by Hummels and Skiba in partial 
equilibrium, the shipper increases his price from 9.6% under MFN (d=0) to 10.2% 
under FTA (d=1) ).  
 
 
Insert here Figure 4: “Welfare Implication of PTA with Endogenous Transport Costs” 
                                                     
14  For a detailed discussion of the results with non-zero intra-continental transport costs see 
Frankel (1997, p.320-321), Baier and Bergstrand (2004, p.42-44). 
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Endogenous Transport Technologies.  Figure 4 shows that for the selected 
parameterization, 
pW never enters the welfare-reducing zone when a regional 
PTA is implemented. Actually, a “virtuous circle” is generated: the additive intra-
bloc trade (due to the decrease in intra-regional tariff) increases the demand for 
intra-regional transport services which leads the monopolist to adopt lower 
marginal costs technologies on these routes and then to offer a lower intra-
regional freight rate, bf , which in turn boosts intra-bloc trade and positively 
affects trade creation.15  
 
This optimistic conclusion is partly due to the parameterization which does not 
impose high sunk cost to obtain marginal transport cost gains. With higher fixed 
costs per unit decrease in marginal costs, the “jump” to the associated higher 
welfare curves (the dotted lines in figure 4, normalized to 1 under MFN regime 
and the first technology could be called iso-technology welfare curves) would 
occur later. Then, with more costly technologies, poor countries may sometimes 
and temporarily enter the welfare-reducing zone (until the adoption of the next 
technology).16  
 
This said, the welfare curve reported in figure 4 is in accordance with the 
econometric assessments of economies of scale in transport reported previously. 
Between MFN ( )0d =  and a full regional FTA ( )1d =  status, import demand 
increases by 133% while the price of intra-regional transport services ( )bf  
decreases by around 16% (see table 2 columns 2 and 3). This estimate corresponds 
to the estimation suggested by the econometric evidence reported earlier, namely 
that “doubling trade quantities along a route reduces shipping costs by a 12 
percent on that route”.  
                                                     
15 Note that intra and inter-continental transport services demands, 
c
q and 
o
q respectively, 
decrease due to trade diversion. Hence, no new technology is adopted on routes between two 
regional and two continental hubs respectively. However, as all trade flows have to pass through a 
regional hub, the improvement on regional routes (and the corresponding decrease in bf ) 
generates positive externalities for all routes (see table 2 column 3) that mitigate the negative 
effects of trade diversion. 
16
 Appendix A.2, available upon request, shows that the results obtained under the set of 
benchmark parameter values are robust. 
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4. The Sequencing of Trade Liberalization 
 
I now consider the sequencing issue (or path dependence) of trade liberalization 
first raised by Bhagwati (1993), recalling than under the traditional exogenous 
transport cost assumption, reaching free trade under multilateralism or 
regionalism would yield the same value. Under the assumption that new transport 
technologies are not reversed (i.e. sunk costs), columns 4 and 5 in table 2 contrast 
resulting transport costs under worldwide free trade under the two alternative 
paths. Column 4 indicates the transport prices charged by the monopolist if 
worldwide free trade is achieved by the following sequence: first simultaneous 
implementation of North-North (N-N) and South-South (S-S) FTAs followed by a 
removal of tariffs between the two resulting blocs. Column 5 reports transport 
costs when worldwide free trade is reached via multilateral tariff reduction. 
 
Comparing the values of the welfare indicator at the bottom of the table indicates a 
higher welfare when free trade is achieved under the regional route. This is due to: 
(i) the adoption of improved transport technologies on intra-regional routes to 
satisfy increased regional trade resulting from preferential tariff elimination as 
shown in figure 4; (ii) gains made thanks to the sequencing whereby going to free 
trade starting with regional free trade only requires developing two routes (intra-
continental and inter-continental) whereas going to free trade multilateral 
requires spreading transport cost savings on the three routes. 17 As shown at the 
bottom of the table, of the 0.61%=2.00%-1.39%, 83% (=0.50%/0.61%) of the gain 
is due to the reduction in transport costs associated with the development of 
regional routes under regional FTAs.  
 
Hence, with scale economies in transport costs and sunk costs, a symmetric (N-N 
and S-S) regionalism path to free trade has a persistent effect on trade flows 
through a permanent effect on regional transport costs that improves poor country 
welfare compared with the alternative multilateral path, i.e. ( ),FT FTNN SS MFNW W> . 
As part of sensitivity analysis, next section explores an alternative path with the 
implementation of North-South (N-S) FTAs.  
                                                     
17 Recall that, as developed in section 2, transport technology is specific to each kind of route.  
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5. Extensions 
 
Independent transport routes.  As an alternative to the “hub-and-spoke” transport 
network structure, I now assume that each country operates under three 
independent routes, each corresponding to one of the three kinds of trade 
partners: regional, continental outside the region and across ocean. It turns out 
that the patterns discussed here are robust to this alternative modeling of 
transports as far as only the regional routes are concerned.  There is no significant 
difference between the two transport structures during the implementation of an 
FTA.18 Concerning the multilateral liberalization stage, this conclusion is strongly 
reinforced: with an “independent routes” network, 
pW  under FTA (but no 
worldwide liberalization) is superior to 
pW  under worldwide free trade reached 
from a MFN situation! Actually, with a multilateral liberalization from a MFN 
situation (with t=30%), trade is spread too thinly among all partners so that the 
improved shipping technology is never adopted.   
 
North-South Regional Blocs. As first noted by de Melo and Panagariya (1993), the 
distinguish feature of the current wave of regionalism is that it is now N-S (rather 
than N-N and S-S during the first wave of regionalism in the 1960s). Figure 5 
contrasts welfare under N-S regionalism with welfare under S-S/N-N considered 
earlier. The evolution of 
pW  during the N-S bloc implementation (i.e. bloc 
between two poor and two rich countries) is close to the evolution of 
pW  under 
multilateral liberalization (but with still the inverted U-shape) as now the two 
sources of gains from trade, product variety and costs differences can be exploited 
within the bloc. 
 
Insert here Figure 5: “Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Trade Blocs” 
 
In terms of reduced transport costs, symmetric blocs lead to a gain of 2% in 
regional marginal transport costs, whereas N-S blocs, in promoting trade on the 3 
routes (regional, continental, across ocean), lead to gains that are spread out over 
the 3 routes (gain of 1% on each marginal transport cost, which is smaller than 
under worldwide free trade). 
                                                     
18 As shown in appendix A.2. (Figures A.3), available upon request. 
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As far as multilateral liberalization is concerned, 
pW  under worldwide free trade 
when reached through N-S regionalism is (i) higher than through MFN 
liberalization (thanks to higher volume of trade and then better technology on all 3 
routes) but (ii) smaller than through symmetric blocs due to less advanced 
regional transport technology (which is the base of all kinds of transport costs in 
our model). Then, the ranking of paths towards Free Trade, for the representative 
parameterization adopted here, the asymmetric bloc approach yields a welfare 
gain of an elimination of protection in-between the alternatives examined earlier, 
i.e. ( ),FT FT FTNN SS NS MFNW W W> > . 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper has challenged the pessimistic view that RTAs between neighbor 
developing countries are likely to be welfare-reducing. South-South trade 
agreements look more favorable once one takes into account scale economies in 
transport (and the associated changes in transport technology from a profit-
maximizing monopoly shipper). For plausible parameter values, a Southern 
country’s welfare never enters in a welfare-reducing zone when an FTA is 
implemented with a Southern regional partner as a “virtuous circle” is set in 
motion: preferential trade reduces intra-regional transport costs, which in turn 
boosts intra-bloc trade leading to trade creation. A regional approach to trade 
liberalization may also be preferable to a multilateral approach in the presence of 
irreversible effects in terms of investments in regional transport technologies. 
 
While these results are at best suggestive, they provide support to several recent 
RTAs. For example, the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) currently 
under negotiation between the EU and ACP involve a North-South FTA built upon 
a prior South-South FTA. More directly, the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD) puts emphasis on investments in regional infrastructure 
and transport networks. Likewise, many South-South RTAs (e.g. MERCOSUR, 
Andean pact, SADC, COMESA, UEMOA) have included “transport and trade 
facilitation” agreements as part of their regional integration initiatives. The 
challenge is to quantify these beneficial channels of regional integration with 
greater accuracy.   
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Table 1: “c.i.f. prices under alternatives transport models” 
 
 With Endogeneous transport costs 
( % of the traded quantity) 
With “iceberg” transport costs 
(% of output lost by the exporting country en route) 
             In a : 
From : 
Rich country 
(1) 
Poor country 
(2) 
Rich country 
(3) 
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o
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   
 
 
Table 2:”Transport costs and Welfare under Different scenarios” 
     ( k=3, α =0.5, σ=4, C=4, Nr=Np=16, B=4) 
 Iceberg Endogenous Transport costs 
  Bench- MFN FTA Worldwide FT 
   -mark     Via FTA Via MFN 
 Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Transport costs on each route           
intra-regional bf  10.0% 9.6% 8.0% 7.8% 7.8% 
intra-continental cf   10.0% 10.1% 10.2% 7.9% 8.3% 
inter-continental of  10.0% 6.5% 6.4% 4.8% 5.2% 
Transport costs between :            
2 poor countries-same bloc 10.0% 9.6% 8.0% 7.8% 7.8% 
2 poor countries-same continent 19.0% 19.7% 18.2% 15.6% 16.1% 
2 poor countries-different continents 27.1% 26.2% 24.7% 20.4% 21.3% 
1 poor country and 1 rich country 18.8% 16.4% 15.6% 12.6% 13.3% 
2 rich countries-same continent 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
2 rich countries-different continents 10.0% 6.5% 6.4% 4.8% 5.2% 
Increase in 
pW  (base=MFN situation) - - +0.50% +2.00% +1.39% 
 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2007.26 
 25 
 
Figure 1: “Hub-and-Spoke” transport network 
(2 continents, 4 regions by continent, 4 countries by region) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: “Evolution of the average cost for the monopoly shipper” 
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Figure 3: “Welfare (
pW ) under a PTA with Exogenous Transport Costs”    
(t=0.3, α =0.5, σ=4, C=4, Nr=Np=16, B=4) 
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Figure 4: “Welfare Implication of PTA with Endogenous Transport Costs” 
     (t=0.3, k=3, α =0.5, σ=4, C=4, Nr=Np=16, B=4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: “Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Trade Blocs” 
     (t=0.3, k=3, α =0.5, σ=4, C=4, Nr=Np=16, B=4) 
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APPENDIX A.1. MODEL EQUATIONS 
As describe in section 2, we assume:  
 
(i) 3 sectors: 
Agriculture, produced with labor under constant returns to scale; 
Intermediate good, produced with capital under increasing returns to scale; 
Manufactures, produced with intermediate good under constant returns to scale; 
 
(ii) 2 types of countries, with a capital to labor ratio of 1 in the poor country and of k>1 
in the rich country;19 
 
(iii) a World of 4 continents ( 4C = ), 2 continents of rich countries and 2 continents 
of poor ones, 16 countries per continent ( 16
r pN N= = ); Each continent comprises 4 
regions; We assume that blocs are implemented between the 4 neighbor countries of a 
same region ( 4B = ); 
 
(iv) a “hub-and-spoke” transport network with 3 types of freight rates: 
fb: intra-regional (from spoke to spoke via the regional hub); 
fc: intra-continental (from a regional hub to another via the continental hub); 
fo: intercontinental (from a continental hub to another); 
 
 
Optimization Problem of Intermediate Input Producers 
 
{ }, 1.. ;
jip ji ji ji ji i iMax p x K r j n i r ppi = − = =  
 
With jipi  the producer profit of the j
th variety in country i, jix (pji) the production 
(producer price) of the jth variety in country i , in the number of intermediate input 
varieties produced in country i and ri  the price of capital in country i. Intermediate inputs 
are produced under monopolistic competition with capital. The total amount of capital 
used in the production of the jth variety in country i, jiK , is: ji jiK xγ β= +  with γ  the fixed 
cost and β the constant marginal cost. 
 
From the first order condition for profit maximization (derivation available upon request) 
we obtain the profit-maximizing price:20 
 
{ }, 1.. ;iiji i j n irp p r pβθ = == =    (A.1) 
 
which, combined with the free entry condition, gives the output per variety: 
 
{ }, 1.. ;(1 )ji i ix x j n r p
θγ
β θ == = =−   (A.2) 
 
                                                     
19 For simplicity we assume that labor, L, also represents the population size and that 1
r p
L L= = . The total 
capital is therefore 
r r
K kL k= =  in a rich economy and  1
p p
K L= = in a poor one. 
20 θ being the parameter of substitution in the final manufactured good production function, see later.  
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Introducing the expression of x into the capital market equilibrium condition of a country 
i, i.e. ( ) ( )
1 1
i in n
i ji ji i j
j j
K K x n xβ γ β γ
= =
= = + = +∑ ∑ , gives the number of varieties produced in 
country i: 
 
( ) { }1 , ;ii iKn r pθγ =
−
=     (A.3) 
 
Equation (A.3) implies that the number of varieties produced in the rich country will be 
larger than in poor countries by a factor of k: 
 
r
p
r
p
n
k
n
K
K
= =       (A.4) 
 
The relative price of capital in rich and poor countries will be denoted as ρ . Hence, 
according to equation (A.1), ρ  is also equal to the price of the home varieties in a rich 
country, pr, relative to that of the home varieties in a poor countries, pp:  
r r
p p
r p
r p
ρ= =       (A.5) 
 
Optimization Problem of Final Good Producer 
 
The prices of foreign intermediate inputs faced by producers of manufactures, in terms of 
the ones produced at home, are given by: 
 
In a rich country:  
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 (1 )
1
1
1 1 1
2 2 2 2
br r
cr r
or r o
b c r b c o
op p o
p p p
p p d t
p p t
p p f t
f f p f f f
p p f t t
p p pρ
= + −
= +
= + +
= + + + + = + + + +






         
  (A.6r) 
 
In a poor country  
( )( )
( )( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 (1 )
1
1
1 1 1
2 2 2 2
bp p b
cp p b c
op p b c o
b c b c o
or r o p
r r r
p p f d t
p p f f t
p p f f f t
f f f f f
p p f t p t
p p p
ρ
= + + −
= + + +
= + + + +
= + + + + = + + + +






   
       
 (A.6p) 
 
with origin r: rich country/ p: poor country/ b: bloc members/ c: other countries (non 
members) within the continent/ o: overseas countries;  
t represents the MFN ad valorem tariff (uniform across countries); 
d represents the degree of intra-bloc liberalization [d=1 (0) free trade area (MFN)]. 
 
The producer of the final good faces the following problem: 
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In a rich country 
 
( )
{
1
0 1
. . ( 1) ( ) 1
2
mr i
r r r r br br r r cr cr r or orr
Max q c
s t n c p B n c p N B n c p n c p
C
N
θ θ θ= < ≤
+ − + − + −
 
 
 
∑
14243 1442443
home varieties varieties from bloc members varieties from other countries of  the continent
varieties from rich cou
2 p p op op mr mr
C
N n c p q p+ ≤






142431442443
varieties from poor countriesntries overseas
  
In a poor country 
 
( ) 1
. . ( 1) ( ) 1
2
mp i
p p p p bp bp p p cp cp p p op op
Max q c
s t n c p B n c p N B n c p n c p
C N
θ θ
=
+ − + − +
 
− 
 
∑
123 1442443 1442443
home varieties varieties from bloc members varieties from other countries of  the continent
varieties from poor cou
2 r r or or mp mp
C
N n c p q p+ ≤







14243144424443
varieties from rich countriesntries overseas
 
with ic  the consumption of an intermediate good variety produced in country i. 
 
Then, the producer of manufactures will demand the following relative quantities of 
intermediate inputs (from the first order conditions, derivation available upon request): 
In a rich country 
{ }
1
1
; ; ;
r
i r
i
p
c c
p
with i cr br or op
θ−
=
=

     


          (A.7r) 
In a poor country 
{ }
1
1
; ; ;
p
i p
i
p
c c
p
with i cp bp op or
θ−
=
=

     


           (A.7p) 
 
In equilibrium, the per capita production of the manufactured good will be: 
 
In a rich country:  ( ) ( )1 1m r p rq c n θ θψ=                           (A.8r) 
( ) ( )
11
11
1 1( ) ( 1)
1 1 (1 )
1
1
2 2
1 1 1 1
2 2
r r
r p
o b c o
r p p p
with k k N B k B
t d t
C Ck N N
f f f ft t
p p p p
θθ
θθ
θθ
θθ
ψ
ρ
−
−
−
−
= + − + −
+ + −
+ − +
+ + + + + +
  
   
   
  
  
            
           
 
In a poor country: ( ) ( )1 1m p p pq c n θ θψ=             
(A.8p) 
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( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1
1
1 1
1 ( ) ( 1)
1 1 1 (1 ) 1
1 1
1
2 2
1 11 1
2 2
p p
b c b
p p p
p r
b c ob c o
r r rp p p
with N B B
f f f
t d t
p p p
C C
N k N
f f ff f f
tt
p p pp p p
θ θ
θ θ
θ
θ
ψ
ρ
− −
−
= + − + −
+ + + + − +
+ − +
+ + + ++ + + +
   
   
   
      
         
      
   
   
            
           
1
θ
θ−



 
The zero profit condition in the production of manufactures yields the price of final 
manufactured goods in terms of the intermediate home variety: 
In a rich country: ( ) 1mr hr p rp p n
θ
θψ
−
=     (A.9r) 
In a poor country: ( ) 1mp hp p pp p n
θ
θψ
−
=      (A.9p) 
 
 
 
Optimization Problem of Consumer 
 
In a rich country  
( ) ( )1 0 1
. .
2
r mr ar
mr mr ar ar r r r
r
Max U c c
s t p c p c r k w T
N
α α
α
pi
−
< ≤=
+ ≤ + + +





 
In a poor country  
( ) ( )1 0 1
. .
p mp ap
mp mp ap ap p p p
Max U c c
s t p c p c r w T
α α
α
−
< ≤=
+ ≤ + +



 
 
with ( )m ac the consumption of manufactures (agriculture) in country i, α the share of 
consumer’s income spent in manufactures and 1 α− in agriculture, pi  the total transport 
monopoly profit (see later) and T the per capita tariff receipts that are handed back to 
consumers as a lump-sum transfer: 
 
In a rich country: 
 
( )
( )
(1 )( 1) ( ) 1
2
2 2 2 2 2
r r r br r r r cr r r or r o
b c b c
p p op p o ap oar ar
C
T t d B n p c N B n p c N n c p f
C f f f f
N n c p f p fC q
= − − + − + − +
+ + + + + + +
  
   
   
+ −   
   
(A.10r) 
In a poor country:  
( ) ( )
( )
(1 )( 1) ( )
1
2 2 2 2
cp p bp p b p p cp p b
b c
p p op p b o r r or r oc
T t d B n c p f N B n c p f f
C C f f
N n c p f f f N n c p f
= − − + + − + +
+ − + + + + + + +


  
   
   
(A.10p) 
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The first order conditions of the consumer optimization problem yield: 
In a rich country: 
2
2
1
r
r
ar r r r
ar
mr r r r
mr
N
N
c r k w T
p
c r k w T
p
pi
pi
α
α
+
+
−
= + +
= + +
  
 
  

 
   
  (A.11r) 
In a poor country: 
( )
( )
1
ap p p p
ap
mp p p p
mp
c r w T
p
c r w T
p
α
α
−
= + +
= + +






   (A.11p) 
 
 
Equilibrium in the Market for an Intermediate Input Variety  
 
Produced in a rich country: 
( ) { ( )
( )
1 1
1 1
1
1 1
1 ( )
1 1 (1 ) 1
1
1
2
1 1
r r r r
r r
o
r
L c B c N B c
d t t
C
N c
f
t
p
θ θθγ
β θ
−
−
= + − + −
− + − +
+ −
+ +

    
   
  

 
 
    
   
  
  
1444244431444424444314243 demand
from home from other countries of the continentfrom bloc memberssupply
( )
1
1 1
1
2
1 1
2 2
p p
b c o
r r r
C
N c
f f f
t
p p p
θ θ
ρ
− −
+
+ + + +

 
 
 
  
  
   

144444424444443 14444444244444443
from rich countries overseas from poor countries overseas
 (A.12r) 
Produced in a poor country: 
( ) { ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 ( )
1
1 (1 ) 1 1 1
p p p p
b b c
p p p
L c B c N B c
f f fd t t
p p p
θ θ
θγ
β θ
− −
= + − + −
−
+ − + + + +
   
   
   
      
         
      
14243
144444424444443 144444424 3
demand
from homesupply
from bloc members from other countries of the continent
( ) ( )
1 1
1 1
1
1
2 2
1 1 1 1
2 2
p p r r
b c o b c o
p p p p p p
rich
C C
N c N c
f f f f f f
t t
p p p p p p
θ θ
ρ
− −
+ − +
+ + + + + + + +









   
   
     
         
         
      
44444
1444444442444444443 1444 2
from poor countries overseas from countries overseas









4444 44444443
(A.12p) 
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Equilibrium Condition in Agriculture  
 
The production function in agriculture is given by: { }, ;ai ai iq L r p== .  
 
Therefore, given perfect competition: { }, ;ai i ip w r p==              (A.13) 
with 
aip the price of agriculture and iw the wage in country i. 
 
Since agriculture is a homogeneous good, the law of one price requires the following 
relative wage between the rich and the poor country:  
(1 ) 1
2 2
r b c o
p p p p
w f f f
t
w w w w
= + + + +
 
 
 
   (A.14) 
The equilibrium in the agriculture sector is given by: 
2 2 2 2r ar p ap p ap r ar
C C C C
N q N q N Lc N Lc+ = +               
  (A.15) 
 
 
Transport Sector 
 
We assume then that a monopoly shipper makes decisions about how to price transport 
services and which technology to use, maximizing the following profit, pi : 
 
, ,
( ) ( ) ( )
b c of f f b b b c c c o o o b c oMax f q f q f q F F Fpi κ κ κ= − + − + − − − −     (A.16) 
 
, ,b c oq q q : total traded quantity requiring respectively intra-regional, intra-continental 
and across ocean transport services  
, ,b c oF F F : fixed costs required by the technology of transport services between two 
spokes, two regional hubs and two continental hubs respectively; 
, ,b c oκ κ κ : marginal cost per unit shipped between two spokes, two regional hubs and two 
continental hubs respectively. 
 
Demand for transport services (qb; qc; qo) can be written: 
 
qb: equal to the sum of all demands of foreign goods, i.e. the sum of all consumptions of 
foreign goods:  
1( 1) ( ) ( )
2 2 2
1 1(2 ) ( )
2 2 2
b p p bp p p cp p p op r r or
r p p op ar ar
C C
q N n B c n N B c n N c n N c
C
N n N c c q
= − + − + +
+ + −
 
  
 
  
  (A.17) 
 
qc: equal to the sum of all demands for foreign goods from outside the bloc, i.e.: 
1( ) ( )
2 2 2
1 1(2 ) ( )
2 2 2
c p p p cp p p op r r or
r p p op ar ar
C C
q N n N B c n N c n N c
C
N n N c c q
= − + +
+ + −
 
  
 
  
          (A.18) 
 
qo: equal to the sum of imports from other continent countries:  
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( )
2 2
( ) ( )
2 2
o p p p op r r or
r r p or p p op ar ar
C C
q N n N c n N c
C C
N n N c n N c c q
= +
+ + + −
 
  
 
  
                               (A.19) 
 
Concerning the monopoly cost function, we assume that the total cost of the transport 
service production is the following: 
 
, ,
h h h
h b c o
T C F qκ
=
= +∑     (A.20) 
 
To produce transport services the monopoly uses poor country’s labor.  
Total number of workers hired by the monopoly in each poor country is given by: 
1
2kp p p
TC
L
N w
=
 
 
 
     (A.21) 
We also assume that the agriculture sector acts as a “residual employer”: 
ap kpL L L= − .21 
Hence, an increasing demand of transport services may slow down the agriculture 
production (through the decrease in the agriculture labor force) which in turn may 
increase the agriculture price pap and then the wage paid in poor countries wp.22 
 
 
All these equations together with the normalization wp=1 allow us to 
determine the prices of production factors ( ); ; ;r p r pr r w w .23  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
21 As the monopoly only used poor country’ labor, we always have, in rich countries: 0
kr
L =  and 
then 1
ar kr
L L L= − = . 
22 As wp is used as numéraire in the model, an increase in wp is actually reflected by a decrease in prices of 
other goods.  
23 As, in equations for equilibrium in the intermediate input (eq. A.12), the consumption of the home variety cr 
and cp can be replaced by an expression in terms of the respective prices of factors in rich and poor countries 
respectively (obtained from eq. (A.8), (A.9), (A.10), (A.11), (A.14)): 
In rich country: 
( ) ( )( )
( )( )
1
1
1 1
1
1 1
1 (1 )
1
2
r
r
r
p
r
ar
r r
w
k t t
r
c
n
tk d B
d t
L
N r
θ
αθ
β
ψ α
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−
+ + +
=
+ + −
+ −
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 
 
 
 
 
In poor country: 
( )
( )
1
1
1
1
1 1 1
1
1 (1 ) 1
p
p
p
p
b
p p
bp
p
w
r
c
n
t f
d B
ft p
d t
p
θ
α θ
β
ψ α ψ
−
+
=
− − − − +
+
+ − +
                      
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APPENDIX A.2. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND EXTENSIONS 
 
Throughout the simulations, we worked with the same benchmark set of parameter values 
(t=0.3, k=3, α =0.5 or θ=0.75) and with some important assumptions on the structure of 
the transport network (“hub-and-spoke” type). We now study how sensitive the results 
are to some changes in the parameter values or in assumptions. 
 
Relative importance of product variety and comparative advantage as 
sources of gains from trade. 
 
Two parameters are concerned: α  (Cobb-Douglas utility function parameter that 
represents the share of consumer’s income spent in manufactures) and θ  (Dixit-Stiglitz 
production function parameter that represents preference for variety in intermediate 
inputs). An increase inθ , for a given α , results in higher elasticity of substitution 
between varieties of intermediate input and thus in greater changes in the consumption 
responses to given changes in relative prices. Hence, the welfare effects of trading blocs 
become more important for higher values of θ  (see details in Spilimbergo and Stein, 
1998). The evolution evidenced in figures 3 and 4 is reinforced as traded quantities are 
more sensitive to tariff changes and new transport technologies are adopted more 
quickly.24 An increase (decrease) in α , for a given θ , results in higher relative importance 
of product variety (comparative advantage) as a source of gains from trade. We report 
simulations in figures A.1 and A.2.  
 
 
Figures A.1. Higher relative importance of comparative advantage as a source of gains 
(t=0.3, k=3, θ=0.75, C=4, Nr=Np=16, B=4). 
 
Preferential Trade Agreement                 Multilateral Liberalization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Qualitative results remain. At the first stage (PTAs welfare vs. MFN), with 0.8α = , love 
for variety is increased. This boosts the trade creation within symmetric trade blocs 
leading to a regional welfare increase. In the same way, trade diversion is reinforced, in 
line with the shape of the regional curve in figures A.1. With 0.2α = , the share of trade 
flows based on comparative advantages increases thereby limiting the effect of regional 
preferential tariff on trade between countries with similar factor endowments. However, 
                                                     
24 However, for very high values of θ  (θ >0.95 in our model), as θ  approaches 1, the taste for variety 
disappears and so does the intra-industry trade, thus reducing the effects of symmetric trading blocs  (see 
figures 2 through 5 in Spilimbergo and Stein, 1998). 
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Note that in the two cases ( 0.8α =  and 0.2α = ), we observe a similar evolution in the 
demand of regional transport services, bq , and then similar change in the adoption of new 
transport technologies. 25 This explains that at the end, for d=1, a similar level of regional 
welfare is reached (relative to MFN welfare). 
 
As far as the second stage (multilateral liberalization from symmetric FTA or from MFN) 
is concerned, the increasing gap between the two curves remains. In the model, 
multilateral liberalization mainly impacts on North-South trade, which is essentially 
based on comparative advantage. Hence, it is not surprising that increasing the relative 
importance of comparative advantage as source of gains from trade implies a stronger 
welfare increase during the multilateral liberalization stage. In any case (i.e. whatever the 
value of α ), the gap between the two curves (multilateral liberalization from regionalism 
and from MFN) increases during the multilateral liberalization stage, all the more since 
α  (i.e. love for variety) is important. 
 
 
Figures A.2. Higher relative importance of product variety as a source of gains (t=0.3, 
k=3, θ=0.75, C=4, Nr=Np=16, B=4). 
 
Preferential Trade Agreement                 Multilateral Liberalization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, note that changes in the relative difference in North / South capital endowment, 
k, provide similar results than changes inα . Assuming a decrease in k is equivalent to 
increasing the relative importance of product variety as a source of gains from trade (until 
k=1 where only intra-industry trade remains). Alternatively, an increase in k corresponds 
to a boost in trade based on comparative advantage consideration. 
 
Structure of the Transport Network 
 
We have assumed a “hub-and-spoke” transport network structure: for each country, all 
trade flows pass through the regional hub and all trade flows with countries outside the 
bloc pass through the continental hub. On the other extreme, we can assume that, for 
each country, there exist three independent routes corresponding to the three kinds of 
trade partners: regional, continental outside the region and across ocean. In such a 
                                                     
25 Remember that, for each country, all trade flows pass through the regional hub. Hence, a FTA that 
generates a strong regional trade creation associated with a strong trade diversion may have the same impact 
on the evolution qb than a FTA with little trade impact (weak trade creation as diversion). The results should 
be different with another assumption on transport network, see next section. 
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transport structure, transport costs for trade between two countries in the same region 
are equal to fb, transport costs for trade between countries in different regions of a same 
continent are equal to fc and across ocean trade costs are equal to fo. Figures A.3. 
compare results for a “hub-and-spoke” transport network with those for an “independent 
routes” one. 
 
Figures A.3. “hub-and-spoke” vs. “independent routes” transport network. 
     (t=0.3, k=3, α =0.5, θ=0.75, C=4, Nr=Np=16, B=4) 
 
Preferential Trade Agreement            Multilateral Liberalization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is no significant difference between the two transport structures during the 
implementation of a FTA. Actually, even if demand for regional transport services 
increases more quickly with the assumption of “independent routes” (with the “hub-and-
spoke” network, the increase in demand for regional routes was limited by the trade 
diversion, which is no more the case with an independent regional route), the total 
volume of regional imports is smaller (as regional route are now only use by for regional 
trade). Then, monopoly shipper profits on these routes is smaller than with a “hub-and-
spoke” network and new transport technology appears relatively more costly.  
 
Concerning the multilateral liberalization stage, conclusions are quite different depending 
on the transport network assumption: with an “independent routes” network, FTA’s 
welfare is superior to that for worldwide free trade reached through MFN clause. This is 
due to the fact that with a MFN liberalization, trade is spread too thinly among all 
partners so that the improved shipping technology is never adopted.26 We join the 
analytical conclusion of Skiba (2004) that finds that “if regional economies of scale in 
transport are strong enough, then it is possible to improve world welfare relative to free 
trade by forming preferential trading blocs”. In his model, iceberg transport costs depend 
on the total volume of bilateral trade (assuming then that there are as many independent 
routes as trade partners and no hubbing).  
 
Finally, note that a limit of our analysis is that we have always assumed a “pre-
determined” network while we can also imagine an endogenous determination of these 
hubs according to the trade development. This is done by Tomoya and Nishkimi (2002) 
who develop a general equilibrium model of a spatial economy in which the structure of 
the transport network is determined by the interaction between industrial location 
behavior and increasing returns in transport.  
 
                                                     
26 In the simulation reported in figure A.3., only change in across ocean trade is sufficient to adopt new 
technologies that allow a decrease of one point of percentage in across ocean marginal transport costs (instead 
of a gain of two points of percentage on regional marginal transport costs under FTA stage). 
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